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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
assumption that reasoning applicable in vendee's suits is
equally applicable in vendor's suits and that the rules must
be the counterparts of each other .1
The instant decision was foreshadowed in one case,
Bartran v. Hering,5 in which it was declared that a vendor
who declines to perform a bad bargain, in such form as to
be susceptible of specific enforcement, must pay the value
of the bargain, if the vendee elects to bring assumpsit. It
is well that the highest court has now set this matter at
rest. J. P. McKeehan
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CONFLICTING PRE-
SUMPTIONS-EFFECT OF REMOVAL OF DISABIL-
ITY UPON MATRIMONIAL CONDUCT-A recent Penn-
sylvania case, Holben's Estate, 93 Super. Ct. 472 (1928),
presents some interesting questions of the law of marriage,
(1) the conflict between the presumption of the continuance
of a meretricious relationship and the presumption of mar-
riage arising from subsequent cohabitation and reputation
as husband and wife, (2) the creation of a true marital
status after removal of a disability which has made the pre-
vious matrimonial conduct illicit.
The case involved the right to share as widow in the
distribution of a decedent's estate. The claimant was mar-
ried in 1871 to one Eastman, in Tennessee, where they lived
until 1882. At that time, he left the state without her
knowledge, and she never heard from him again. Soon
after this desertion, she removed to Pennsylvania, and
sometime prior to 1898 heard from a friend in Tennessee
that her husband was reported to be dead. She employed
an attorney to ascertain the truth of this report, which he
was unable to do. In 1898, she married the decedent, and
they lived together as husband and wife until his death in
1926. In 1903, the claimant learned that her first husband
had died, after remarrying in Michigan in 1900. On these
facts the Orphans' Court disallowed her claim as widow.
On appeal the Superior Court, with two judges dissenting,
17See 3 Sedgewick on Damages, 9th Ed. sec. 1009. 2 Sutherland
on Damages, sec. 583, p. 2003; Parrish v. Koons, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas.
78 (1844); Twitchell v. Phila. 33 Pa. 212 (1859); Schultz v. Burlock, 6
Super. 574 (1898); and other clearly erroneous decisions which might
be cited.
1818 Super. 395 (1901).
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reversed the decree of the Orphans' Court on the following
grounds: (1) The presumption of innocence of Eastman in
remarrying and the presumption that he had obtained a
divorce from the claimant prior to her marriage to decedent
in 1898; (2) even if the marriage of claimant and decedent
was illegal in its inception, the presumption of a valid mar-
riage from cohabitation and reputation as husband and wife
for over twenty years after Eastman's death.
It is the present purpose to discuss the question pre-
sented in the second of the two grounds upon which the
Court based its reversal. Where a person marries, having
a spouse living, it is universally held that the second mar-
riage is absolutely void. It is also clear that a relationship
between a man and woman, illicit in its inception, is pre-
sumed so to continue until a changed relation is proved.'
On the other hand, it is indubitable that cohabitation and
reputation as husband and wife, although not per se mar-
riage, are circumstances from which a valid marriage may
be presumed.2
Often these two presumptions exist in the same case,
sharply conflicting with each other and presenting the ques-
tion as to which shall prevail. Suppose that A and B start
to live together meretriciously and then after a period of
years it can be shown that they lived together as husband
and wife and were so regarded by their friends and neigh-
bors. It has been generally held in Pennsylvania that the
presumption of marriage which arises from proof of co-
habitation and reputation will not prevail against nor defeat
the presumption that the relationship, illicit in its incep-
tion, is presumed so to continue.3 In such a case, therefore,
no marriage is proved. In order to overcome the presump-
tion that the meretricious relationship continues, it is
necessary to prove the fact of marriage by direct evidence,
that is by proof of a ceremonial marriage in compliance
'Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294 (1878); Appeal of Reading Fire Ins.
and Trust Co., 113 Pa. 204 (1886); Grimm's Estate, 131 Pa. 199 (1890);
Patterson's Estate, 237 Pa. 24 (1912); Fuller's Estate, 250 Pa. 78
(1915); Bisbing's Estate, 266 Pa. 529 (1920); Stevenson's Estate, 272
Pa. 291 (1922); Craig's Estate, 273 Pa. 530 (1922); McDevitt's Estate,
280 Pa. 50 (1924); Comm. v. Phillips, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 213 (1924).2Cases cited in note 1, supra, and Wallace's Estate, 40 Pa. Super.
Ct. 595 (1909); but it is not a presumption of law, i. e., not conclusive,
Comm. v. Haylow, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 541 (1901); Comm. v. Gamble,
36 Pa. Super. Ct. 146 (1908).
sSee cases cited supra, note 1.
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with the statutory regulations or a "common-law marriage"
by proof of an exchange of words in the present tense,
"per verba de praesenti". There is apparently no case to
be found in which the Courts of Pennsylvania have held
that the presumption of the continuance of a meretricious
relationship can be overcome by circumstantial evidence,
that is, facts from which a presumption of marriage will
arise, for instance, cohabitation and reputation. Two re-
cent cases, however, have intimated that the change .from
a meretricious relationship to lawful common-law marriage
may be established by circumstantial evidence, but the cir-
cumstances must be such as to exclude the presumption that
the original relationship continued and to prove satisfact-
orily that it was changed to matrimonial union by mutual
consent.5 In both these cases there was sufficient proof of
cohabitation and reputation justifying a presumption of
marriage but in each case the alleged widow, on cross ex-
amination, admitted that no marriage had ever occurred
and consequently the presumption of the continuance of
the meretricious relationship prevailed. In -view of the
fact that "society rests upon marriage and the law favors
it",6 that the Courts are anxious to find marriage where the
legitimacy of children is involved, and further that the law
ought to presume compliance with the requirements of
law, of morality and of common decency,7 the Courts might
well follow the intimation of the Supreme Court that the
presumption of the continuance of a meretricious relation-
ship may be overcome by strong circumstantial evidence of
marriage.
The conflict between these presumptions arises in
another class of cases. Suppose that A and B are married
but the marriage is void because A already had another
living spouse, C. Of course, as seen above, the relationship
between A and B, being illicit in its inception, is presumed
so to continue. But supposing the disability or impediment
to the validity of the marriage of A and B is removed by
the divorce or death of C, and the cohabitation and repu-
tation of A and B as husband and wife continues. Will the
presumption of marriage arising therefrom destroy the con-
4McCausland's Estate, 213 Pa. 189 (1906); Knecht v. Knecht, 261
Pa. 410 (1918).
5McDevitt's Estate, supra, note 1; Edwards v. Enterprise Mfg.
Co., 283 Pa. 420 (1925); both quote from 18 R. C. L. 420.
6Comm. v. Haylow, supra, note 2.
7Thewlis' Estate, 217 Pa. 307 (1907).
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flicting presumption that the void or illicit relationship con-
tinues? In other words if the parties continue their matri-
monial conduct after the removal of the impediment, what
is the effect of such removal on the matrimonial conduct,
i. e. cohabitation and reputation, as evidence of a valid mar-
riage? With respect to the good faith of the parties the
cases involving this problem may be grouped into three
classes.
The first class consists of those cases where the matri-
monial conduct of the parties entering into a marriage
contract while under an impediment was known to both
parties to be illicit. Here it is generally held that the pre-
sumption of continuance of the meretricious relationship
will not be overcome by the presumption of marriage aris-
ing from subsequent cohabitation and reputation and that a
new contract of marriage must be shown after removal of
the impediment," although the English and New York cases
incline to a contrary view.9
In the second class of cases both parties desire mar-
riage and contract in good faith, neither knowing of the
existence of the impediment. In such a case, lawful mar-
riage will, in all jurisdictions, be presumed at once from
continued cohabitation and reputation upon the removal
of the impediment."
The conflict arises in the third class where one party
knows of the impediment but conceals it from the other
who, in good faith, enters into the supposed marital re-
lationship under a void marriage. One of the leading cases
involving this problem holds that marriage cannot be pre-
sumed from continued cohabitation and reputation after
the removal of the impediment, 1 the Court stating that the
subsequent cohabitation of the parties and their reputation
as husband and wife must necessarily be understood as
having had their origin in the first marriage and could not
be treated as presumptive evidence of a second marriage
at a later date. On the other hand it has been held in
sWhite v. White, 82 Cal. 427 (1890); Rose v. Rose, 67 Mich. 619
(1888); Clark v. Barney, 103 Pac. (Okla.) 598 (1909). This would be
the view in Pennsylvania under the principles stated in the cases,
cited supra, note 1.
9Geiger v. Ryan, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 722 (1908); In re Biersack,
96 Misc. (N. Y.) 161 (1916); Campbell v. Campbell, L. R. 2 H. L.
269 (1867).
10Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68 N. J. Eq. 736 (1904).
"Collins v. Voorhees, 47 N. J. Eq. 315 (1890),
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Pennsylvania in a similar situation that the presumption
of the continuance of an illicit relationship gives way to
the superior presumption in favor of compliance with the
requirements of law, of morality, and of common decency
and that marriage may be presumed from cohabitation and
reputation after the removal of the impediment . How-
ever the cohabitation and reputation subsequent to the re-
moval of the impediment must be of such duration as to
justify a presumption of marriage. Accordingly it has
been held that cohabitation and reputation for a period of
one week,18 or two months, 1 4 after the removal of the
impediment was insufficient and the presumption of the
continuance of the illicit relationship prevailed.
The principal case would fall under either the second
or third class of cases hereinabove discussed and accord-
ingly the Court reached the proper conclusion that marriage
could be presumed from the continued cohabitation and
reputation of the claimant and decedent after the death of
the claimant's first husband.
The Court also sustained the contention that the
claimant and decedent were validly married on the ground
that there was a presumption of innocence on the part of
Eastman in remarrying, that is, it must be presumed that
he obtained a divorce from the claimant before his second
marriage and that, therefore, the marriage between the
claimant and the decedent was valid from its inception.
Similar reasoning is to be found in other cases.' 5
Fred S. Reese
CORPORATE LOANS TAX-FOREIGN CORPORA-
TION DOING BUSINESS IN PENNSYLVANIA-NON-
RESIDENT TREASURER-The decision in Common-
wealth v. Sun Oil Company' shows an important develop-
ment in the application of Pennsylvania Corporate Loans
12Thewlis' Estate, supra, note 7; and see 1 Bishop, Marriage and
Divorce, sec. 970.
1"Grimm's Estate, supra, note 1.
14Hunt's Appeal, supra, note 1.
"Wiles' Estate, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 435 (1898); Thewlis' Estate,
supra, note 7.
1294 Pa. 99 (1928).
